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Abstract
This paper addresses questions about how the levels of causality (gen-
eric and single-case causality) are related. One question is epistemological:
can relationships at one level be evidence for relationships at the other
level? We present three kinds of answer to this question, categorised
according to whether inference is top-down, bottom-up, or the levels are
independent. A second question is metaphysical: can relationships at one
level be reduced to relationships at the other level? We present three
kinds of answer to this second question, categorised according to whether
single-case relations are reduced to generic, generic relations are reduced
to single-case, or the levels are independent.
We then explore causal inference in autopsy. This is an interesting
case study, we argue, because it refutes all three epistemologies and all
three metaphysics. We close by sketching an account of causality that
survives autopsy—the epistemic theory.
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1 Introduction
Intuitively, different causal claims operate at different levels. For instance, the
claim that smoking is a cause of lung cancer appears to be at a different level
to the claim that Harry’s smoking is a cause of his lung cancer. In this paper
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we investigate what this difference between levels amounts to. In particular,
we shall look at various epistemological and metaphysical claims as to the rela-
tionship between the levels of causality, arguing against a range of views and in
favour of one particular position.
There are various ways in which one can distinguish levels of causality. We
will be interested in the generic/single-case distinction. A causal claim of the
form C is a cause of E is generic if at least one of the causal relata C or E is
generic, i.e., can be instantiated on more than one occasion. Otherwise the claim
is single-case. Thus Helicobacter Pylori is a cause of gastric ulcer is a generic
claim, while the Helicobacter Pylori in Harry’s stomach caused his gastric ulcer
is single-case. Usually, either both relata are generic or both relata are single-
case—apparent cases of mixed causal claims are typically at root homogeneous.
Thus, the war is a cause of all my troubles in fact has two single-case relata since
all my troubles can only be instantiated once. However there are some genuine
cases of mixed causal claims; for example, in a nested causal relationship such
as smoking causing cancer is a cause of restrictions on tobacco advertising, the
cause is single-case (a fact) while the effect is generic (Williamson and Gabbay,
2005). We will class causal claims with mixed-level relata as generic-level claims.
The generic/single-case distinction is similar in spirit to the type/token dis-
tinction common in philosophy (a token is a particular object while a type is a
kind of object or entity). While causal claims sometimes appear to relate objects
or kinds of object (e.g., this government is a cause of the pauper), causal relata
are more properly construed as events, variables, facts, omissions and so on (e.g.,
this government’s actions are a cause of the recent increase in poverty). Hence
a distinction between type-level causal claims and token-level causal claims is,
strictly speaking, rarely applicable. But ‘type/token causality’ is also often more
loosely used just to invoke the generic/single-case distinction.
A more useful distinction between levels is the population/individual distinc-
tion. A causal relatum is individual-level if it concerns a particular individual
or unit of observation, while it is population-level if it concerns a population or
collection of units. Note that the population/individual distinction does not in
general correspond to the generic/single-case distinction. Consider the drop in
birth-rate in 1990 is a cause of his financial successes; here the drop in birth-
rate in 1990 is population-level but single-case, while his financial successes is
individual-level but generic. The population/individual distinction will not play
a role in this paper.
Common in the social sciences is the aggregate-level/individual-level/multi-
level distinction. These descriptions are often used to describe a kind of model
or the kind of variables that are used in a model. This is close to the popula-
tion/individual distinction, but individual-level can here apply to a ‘statistical
individual’, i.e., an arbitrary individual selected at random from a population,
which is essentially population-level in the sense of the previous distinction
(Russo, 2009, Chapter 6).
There are, of course, other ways in which one can distinguish between levels,
including levels of organisation in mechanisms, levels of composition, and levels
of size (Craver, 2007, Chapter 5). But those outlined above are perhaps the
most important given our focus on causality. We will be concerned just with
the generic/single-case distinction in this paper.
In this paper we ask how the levels of causality are related. We divide
this into two questions. The first is epistemological: how can relationships at
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one level be evidence for causal relations at the other level? The second is
metaphysical: how can relationships at one level be reduced to relationships at
the other level?
In §2 we present three different answers to the epistemological question.
In §3 we present three different answers to metaphysical question. Then, in
§4 we present in some detail a case study of causal inference in autopsy. We
argue that the case of autopsy refutes all three answers to the epistemological
question (§5) and all three answers to the metaphysical question (§6). But all is
not lost—we just have to accept that causal epistemology and metaphysics are
more complicated than might appear at first sight. In particular, as explained
in §6, an epistemic theory of causality offers scope for giving a coherent account
of causality at both levels.
2 Three Causal Epistemologies
Three basic kinds of epistemological view as to the relationship between generic-
level and single-case causal claims have been predominant in the literature. We
shall sketch these in this section.
Top down. One view is that is that epistemic access to causal relationships
flows from the top, generic level, down to the bottom, single-case level: first we
learn about generic causal relations, and only via this generic causal knowledge
do we infer the truth of single-case causal claims. This is arguably Hume’s view:
It appears that, in single instances of the operations of bodies, we
never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event
following another; without being able to comprehend any force or
power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and
its supposed effect. ...
Even after one instance or experiment, where we have observed
a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to
form a general rule .... But when one particular species of event
has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make
no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the
other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of
any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, Cause;
the other, Effect. ...
This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we
can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar
instances, by which it is suggested. ... When we say, therefore, that
one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have
acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference,
by which they become proofs of each other’s existence.(Hume, 1748,
pp. 73–76)
The top-down epistemology is an enduring view, advocated recently by Sober
(1986) for instance. According to Sober, the likelihood of a single-case relation—
e.g., Harry’s smoking is a cause of his cancer—depends on which generic rel-
ations—e.g., smoking causes cancer—hold in the population of reference.
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To say that causal epistemology is top-down is not to say that generic causal
relations provide the only evidence for single-case causal relations. There may
also be experimental evidence or evidence of physical mechanisms, contiguity,
temporal priority, and so on. The generic causal relations are themselves posited
on the basis of non-causal single-case evidence. ‘Non-causal’ here means that
while causal knowledge may be used in the inference to a generic causal relation
of the form A is a cause of B (e.g., to identify the other known causes of B),
there is no known causal relationship between A and B itself. In sum, then, to
infer striking the match is a cause of its lighting, first one learns that striking
matches is a cause of their lighting from repeated observations of particular
strikings and particular lightings together with theoretical knowledge about the
underlying mechanism, and then one particularises this generic causal claim to
the single case by applying the further evidence that the match was struck and it
lit, together with any further knowledge that bears on the mechanism involved
in that particular striking.
Bottom up. An alternative view is that epistemic access to causal relation-
ships flows from the bottom, single-case level, up to the top, generic level: first
we learn about single-case causal relations, and only via this single-case causal
knowledge do we infer the truth of generic causal claims.
This view is natural for those who, contra Hume, maintain that causal re-
lations are directly perceivable. Ducasse (1926, 1968) is a key philosophical
proponent of this position:
Hume’s view that no connection between a cause and its effect is
objectively observable would be correct only under the assumption
that a ‘connection’ is an entity of the same sort as the terms them-
selves between which it holds, that is, for Hume and his followers,
a sense impression. For it is true that neither a color, nor an odor,
nor a sound, nor a taste, nor any other sense impression, ‘connect-
ing’ the cause and the effect, is observable between them. Indeed,
we must even add that if a sense impression were present between
those said to constitute the cause and the effect, it would, from its
very nature as a sense impression, be quite incapable of doing any
connecting and would itself but constitute one more of the entities
to be connected. This is true in particular of the feeling of expecta-
tion which Hume would have us believe is what the words ‘necessary
connection’ ultimately denote.
But there is fortunately no need for us to attempt to persuade
ourselves that whenever people during the past centuries have talked
of objective connection they thus have not really meant it at all. For
the fact is that a causal connection is not a sensation at all, but a
relation. The nature of that relation has already been minutely de-
scribed above. It is, as we have seen, a relation which has individual
concrete events for its terms; and, as analyzed by us, its presence
among such events is to be observed every day. We observe it when-
ever we perceive that a certain change is the only one to have taken
place immediately before, in the immediate environment of another.
(Ducasse, 1926, pp. 63–64)
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Michotte (1962) conducted psychological research and concluded that humans
directly perceive causal relationships. This view has subsequently been devel-
oped by other psychologists—e.g., Leslie and Keeble (1987); Cohen et al. (1998);
Schlottmann and Surian (1999); Twardy and Bingham (2002); Muentener and
Carey (2006).
Independent levels. A third view is that epistemic access to causal rela-
tionships is neither top-town nor bottom-up but proceeds independently at the
single-case and generic levels. Thus we learn about single-case causal relations,
not by particularising generic causal knowledge but directly from single-case
data; we learn about generic causal relations not by generalising single-case
causal knowledge but directly from generic data. Thus Eells, for example, says:
I argue that (1) very little (if anything) about what happens on
the token level can be inferred from type-level probabilistic causal
claims, and that (2) very little (if anything) about type-level proba-
bilistic causal relations can be inferred form token-level probabilistic
causal claims. (Eells, 1991, p. 6)
Eells’ position was, as we will see in §3, motivated by metaphysical considera-
tions.
The independent-levels view might also be motivated by observing that both
the top-down and bottom-up epistemologies have their share of problems. Top-
down inference is subject to an analogue of the ecological fallacy. The ecological
fallacy—a case of Simpson’s paradox—was put forward by Robinson (1950). On
the basis of evidence of the 1930 US census, Robinson showed that (generically)
the literacy rate and the proportion of immigrants are positively correlated.
But it is fallacious to infer from this that an immigrant will be more likely
to be literate than a non-immigrant—in fact, analysing individual-level data,
these variables1 are negatively correlated, the explanation being that immigrants
tended to settle in states in which the native population was more literate.
Likewise, it is fallacious to infer, from the fact that hitting your golf ball into
a tree is a generic preventative (i.e., negative cause) of it getting into the hole,
the claim that in a particular single case hitting the tree did not positively
cause it to enter the hole (Salmon, 1980). These fallacies suggest a problem
with the top-down epistemology. On the other hand, bottom-up inference is
itself subject to an analogue of the atomistic fallacy (Nı´ Bhrolcha´in and Dyson,
2007, p. 5). Entering a raﬄe with a single monetary prize is, for all but one
individual, a cause of financial loss. But entering the raﬄe may not be deemed
to be a cause of financial loss at the generic level if the prize is sufficiently large
(if the expected gain is positive). Hence one might have similar reservations
about bottom-up inference to those that were had about top-down inference.
If both top-down inference and bottom-up inference are problematic, the view
that the levels are epistemologically independent has some support.
1Note the change from population-level variables—literacy rate and proportion of immi-
grants—to individual-level variables—being literate, being an immigrant.
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3 Three Causal Metaphysics
There are three basic kinds of metaphysical view as to the relationship between
generic-level and single-case causal claims. We shall sketch these in this section.
Generic relationships primitive. One view is that single-case causal rela-
tionships are reducible in part to generic causal relationships: generic causal
relationships are primitive and help determine single-case causal relationships.
This was Hume’s view:
We say, for instance, that the vibration of this string is the cause of
this particular sound. But what do we mean by that affirmation?
We either mean that this vibration is followed by this sound, and that
all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds: Or, that
this vibration is followed by this sound, and that upon the appearance
of one the mind anticipates the senses, and forms immediately an
idea of the other. (Hume, 1748, p. 77)
This regular succession and the corresponding transition of mind from cause to
effect constitute Hume’s definitions of generic causation: ‘Similar objects are
always conjoined with similar’ (Hume, 1748, p. 76), and ‘an object followed
by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other’
(Hume, 1748, p. 77). Hence, for Hume, causation in the single case of a vibration
of a string is analysed in terms of generic causation.
The view that generic causal relationships are primitive is a natural one
for many regularity, probabilistic and agency theories of causality. If causality
is analysed as a difference-making relationship—i.e., if the defining feature of
causality is that a cause makes a difference to its effects—and this difference-
making only shows up in a succession of cases, then causality is, at root, a generic
relation. A single-case relation can be construed derivatively as an application
of a generic relation to a single-case scenario.
For example, one kind of probabilistic analysis of causality cashes out the
causal connection in terms of frequency-raising: a cause raises the frequency
of its effects. But frequency itself is a generic relation, in the sense that fre-
quencies are defined on repeatably instantiatable attributes and undefined on
single cases.2 Hence, under such a probabilistic account, the required sense
of difference making can only be manifested in the general case, and causality
must be fundamentally a generic relation. (As Hume indicated, one can go on
to make sense of a single-case causal claim by taking it to be subsumed by a
corresponding generic relation.) The reader is referred to Williamson (2009) for
an introduction to probabilistic theories of causality.
2This fact—that frequency is at root a generic relation—also motivates some accounts
where levels are metaphysically independent, a position discussed below. In fact, it is not
difficult to find cases where at the generic level the causal relatum is, say, a negative causal
factor, and yet there exist single cases where an instantiation of the same causal relatum
is instead a positive causal factor. This situation has led some authors to argue that the
probabilistic account is not undermined by such cases, provided that distinct concepts of
cause at work at distinct levels be defined. A stock example in the philosophical literature is
the golf ball example mentioned in §2. See, for instance, Sober (1984), Sober (1986) Salmon
(1980), Salmon (1984), Eells (1991), and (Russo, 2009, ch. 2 and 6) for a discussion.
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Single-case relationships primitive. A contrasting view holds that generic
causal relationships are reducible in part to single-case relationships: single-case
relationships are primitive and help determine generic relationships.
This view is natural for those difference-making theories of causality in which
the difference-making relation is manifested in the single case rather than the
general case. A probabilistic theory which appeals to a notion of single-case
chance is just such a theory, as is a counterfactual theory according to which
possible worlds yield the truthmakers of counterfactuals.3
This view is also natural under the principal alternative to the difference-
making approach, namely the mechanistic approach to causality. Thus if causal
relationships are analysed in terms of physical processes that manifest conserved
quantities (Dowe, 2000; Salmon, 1998), or in terms of connections in complex-
systems mechanisms (Glennan, 1996), or in terms of dispositional capacities
in the context of a nomological machine (Cartwright, 1999, Chapter 3), then
causal relationships are analysed in terms of physical processes or mechanisms
connecting single cases, and so it is single-case causal relations that are being
analysed (Cartwright, 1989, Chapter 3). Derivatively, a generic causal relation
can be thought of as a generalisation of underlying single-case relations.4
Independent levels. A third view has it that neither is the single-case re-
ducible to the generic nor is the generic reducible to the single-case; rather, each
level is to be analysed independently.
This view is appropriate for those advocate a particular kind of metaphysical
pluralism concerning causal claims. According to this kind of pluralism, single-
case causal relations are to be analysed one way, but generic relations another.
Eells (1991), for example, argues that two probabilistic analyses of causality
are required: a probability-comparison analysis at the generic level and a quite
different probability-trajectory analysis at the single-case level:
The problems of type and token probabilistic causation turn out to
be quite distinct. Causal claims made on one of the two levels of
causation turn out to be quite independent of claims made on the
3It is worth noting that in the account of Lewis (1973), truth conditions of counterfactuals
are given in terms of similarity of worlds, and although similarity is not fully explicated in
Lewis but taken as a primitive notion, it remains possible that the single-case causal relation
depends on generic facts.
4Cartwright’s capacity view of causality is close to the complex-systems mechanism view
in important respects: complex-systems mechanisms and nomological machines are both con-
ceived of as the underlying physical structures that are responsible for regularities, and they
are responsible for those regularities in virtue of the way their components are organised and
the behaviour that these components can engage in (Glennan, 1996; Bechtel and Abrahamsen,
2005; Machamer et al., 2000; Cartwright, 1999). But there are differences—for example, the
behaviour of the components is variously underwritten by capacities (which are a special sort
of dispositional property), activities (which differ from capacities in that they can be rela-
tional rather than monadic, and are manifestations rather than dispositions), or laws. The
capacity theory maintains that an effect can only be regularly produced by a cause in the
context of a nomological machine, so the theory may be classed as a mechanistic theory of
causality. It cannot be classed as a difference-making theory because an entity can have a
capacity to make no difference: a homeostatic mechanism has the capacity to maintain the
status quo; a teenager has the capacity to do nothing. To discover a causal regularity we need
to establish the underlying mechanism rather than establish that the cause makes a difference
to its effects: ‘we have to establish the arrangement and capacities of mechanical elements
and the right shielding conditions that keep the machine running properly’ (Cartwright, 1999,
p. 50).
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Figure 1: Template for describing causes of death D on a UK death certificate.
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Figure 2: Template for describing causes of death D on a US death certificate.
other. And the two levels of probabilistic causation require quite
different kinds of theories. (Eells, 1991, p. 6)
Weber (2007) offers the same kind of pluralism but with a different combination
of theories: a difference-making (probabilistic) theory at the generic level, and
a mechanistic theory for the single case.
4 Autopsy
In this section we describe in detail the kinds of inference in autopsy. Autopsy,
we shall argue in §5 and §6, is an interesting case because it refutes all three
epistemologies of §2 and all three metaphysics of §3.
Autopsy (or post mortem) is the examination of one or more corpses, the
goal of which is to establish cause, mechanism and manner of death, and to
individuate any possible injury or disease. Three types of autopsy are usually
distinguished: the coroner’s autopsy, the forensic autopsy, and the clinical or
academic autopsy:
Coroner. In the UK, as in many countries, when someone dies a death cer-
tificate needs to be completed. Usually (in about 55% of cases in England and
Wales) a general medical practitioner signs this certificate, but if the cause of
death is uncertain or unnatural, the death is referred to a coroner for further
investigation. The coroner may have enough information to issue a certificate,
or may arrange for a pathologist to carry out an autopsy. The coroner may also
arrange an inquest into death. The purpose of the coroner’s autopsy is solely
to determine a cause of death, and no consent from next of kin is required. In
1996, 22% of people who died in England and Wales were subject to a coroner’s
autopsy; more than 95% of autopsies conducted in England, Wales and North-
ern Ireland are coroners’ autopsies (NCEPOD, 2006). Identifying the cause of
death without autopsy is error-prone: in the UK and US, at least a third of all
death certificates are incorrect (Roulson et al., 2005); it has been claimed that
in Nigeria this figure may be as high as 71% (Izegbu et al., 2006).
Regulations of coroners’ autopsies vary according to the country’s legal sys-
tem. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, for instance, death is reported
to the coroner if:
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[there is] evident trauma; cause of death unknown; a doctor has
not seen the deceased with known disease within the 14 days pre-
ceding the death; the patient died or was certified in an Accident &
Emergency department; death occurred 14–28 days following surgery
(individual coroner dependent); death was related to a mishap in
hospital; industrial disease or acute poisoning. (Cooper et al., 2007)
In the ‘Death Certification Training Pack’ of the Office for National Statistics,
nine more cases are mentioned, among which: death occurred in a violent or
unnatural way, or there are suspicious circumstances. The death certificate must
give
Ia: the disease or condition directly leading to death and, optionally,
Ib: another disease or condition leading to Ia,
Ic: another disease or condition leading to Ib,
II: other significant conditions contributing to the death but not related to the
disease or condition (Ic–Ia) causing it.
This causal account is depicted in Figure 1. The corresponding template for
death certificates in the US is given in Figure 2. In practice, deciding which
event is the principal and direct cause of death Ia is not always easy, given the
uncertainties involved:
If a man with lung cancer dies of a brain haemorrhage the cancer
will not appear on the death certificate as it did not contribute to
death. The cause of death given is the most probable one, and
acute events are usually deemed more likely to have caused death
than chronic ones, so a man with a recent myocardial infarction and
chronic bronchitis will be deemed to have died of the former. (Alan
Bates, personal communication)
See NCEPOD (2006) for an extended discussion of the coroner’s autopsy.
Forensic. Forensic autopsies (which are rare in the UK but more common
elsewhere) are performed for medico-legal purposes, for instance when a corpse
is found on a crime scene and also in civil law cases in some jurisdictions.
Forensic autopsies are performed by forensic pathologists and do not require
family consent. Often, forensic pathologists not only have to determine a cause
of death but also the identity of the cadaver being examined. In determining the
cause of death, the pathologist is also asked to determine the manner in which
death occurred by identifying the series of events which led to death. Most
jurisdictions include the following ‘manners of death’: homicide, accidental,
natural, suicide, and undetermined. In forensic autopsies, examination may also
serve to collect further evidence relevant to the crime investigated (Matthews,
2008).
Clinical/academic. Clinical or academic autopsies are carried out for med-
ical and research purposes. This kind of autopsy is used to determine more
information about the circumstances of death in a particular individual, or to
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draw general conclusions about the causes of death in a population. In the for-
mer case, which for clarity of exposition we shall refer to as clinical autopsy, a
death certificate is required before the autopsy starts. In the latter case, which
we shall call academic autopsy, the cause of death in each of a series of individ-
uals is established and general conclusions are drawn. These kinds of autopsy
need family consent before they are carried out; they play a very important role
in medicine as they aim to contribute to a better understanding of disease—see
for instance Ayoub and Chow (2008), Dieboled (2007), Aho (2003), Sando et al.
(1999).
Although procedures for carrying out post-mortem examination can be very
similar in the different types of autopsies, it is worth noting that the goals,
and therefore the types of inferences made, are quite distinct. Our interest
lies exactly in the kinds of inference made in coroners’, forensic, clinical and
academic autopsies and in the kinds of evidence needed. In the following, we
will show, first, that in autopsy, generic-to-single-case (i.e., top-down) as well
as single-case-to-generic (i.e., bottom-up) causal inferences are performed, and,
second, that at each level, causal claims depend on evidence both of difference-
making and of mechanisms.
Generic-to-Single-Case. In some kinds of autopsy, single-case non-causal
evidence is used in conjunction with generic causal knowledge to establish a
single-case causal claim. This is true of the coroner’s autopsy and forensic
autopsy, which aim to determine the cause of death in a particular individual;
it is also true of a clinical autopsy, which seeks to further elucidate the network
of causal relationships leading to death in an individual.
Inference in these three kinds of autopsy fits the top-down causal epistemol-
ogy of §2 well: in providing a single-case explanation of death much generic
medical knowledge is taken for granted and indeed used to make inferences to
the single-case.
Consider for instance how injuries or evidence of injuries are examined. In
forensic medicine, the following types of injuries are distinguished: bruise, abra-
sion, laceration, incised wound, puncture or stab wound, gunshot wound, burn,
fracture. Injuries, during autopsy, have to be described according to the loca-
tion, size, shape and colour. Suppose the body shows a deep stab wound in the
aorta blood vessel. Well established generic medical knowledge, notably about
the functioning of the circulatory system, will be used to support the claim that
haemorrhage caused death.
In fact, inference in these kinds of autopsy requires two types of evidence:
mechanistic and difference-making. Reconstructing what happened clearly in-
volves mechanistic considerations, whereas clarifying legally relevant circum-
stances and contexts of death clearly involves difference-making considerations.
Consider again the injury example. The mechanism will be given by describing
the injury; for instance, the dagger entered from above and with a certain incli-
nation, thus provoking a wound of that size and shape, etc. (which might also
provide evidence about the assailant: taller than the victim, for instance). But
there are also difference-making considerations. Suppose the victim is found
with other injuries as well, say fractures, but only light. It will be reasonable to
infer, ceteris paribus, that the stab wound caused death rather than the assault
that caused the fractures.
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In general it is uncontroversial that in the single case the cause of death must
be connected to the death of the individual through both difference-making and
mechanistic considerations. Cause of death has been defined as follows:
the cause of death determined by the certifying physician [is] defined
as (a) the disease or injury that initiated the train of morbid events
leading directly to death, or (b) the circumstances of the accident
or violence that produced the fatal injury. (NCHS, 2003, pp. 9–10)
That there needs to be difference-making is witnessed by the use of ‘initiated’
and ‘produced’: the cause of death must have changed things in a way that
made death more likely. That there needs to be a mechanism is witnessed by
the ‘train of morbid events’ and the causal chains of Figure 1 and Figure 2:
there needs to be a clear physical connection between the initiator and the
death. Hence it should be no surprise that, in order to establish the cause of
death, medical practitioners require evidence not only of a difference-making
relation between the supposed cause and death, but also of a mechanism or
physical connection that explains the difference-making relation from a theo-
retical perspective. Typically, of course, this evidence is encapsulated as prior
knowledge: the medical practitioner needs only identify the event (e.g., a heart
attack) and needs no prompting to recognise the presence of both a (generic)
difference-making connection and a (generic) mechanistic connection to death,
applying this medical training to the single case in question. But in some cases,
the pathologist might need to appeal to scientific research papers to provide
the appropriate mechanistic and difference-making evidence. That mechanistic
evidence guides autopsy inference is made clear in the ‘Guidelines for reports
by autopsy pathologists’ (Adams, 2008, p. v):
Just as a sound knowledge of anatomy is essential to making the
observations that go into the autopsy protocol, a sound knowledge of
the mechanisms of death, that is, pathophysiological derangements,
is necessary to make opinions concerning the cause, mechanism, and
manner of death.
Single-Case-to-Generic. The mode of inference is rather different in the case
of academic autopsy. Here, as before, single-case non-causal evidence is used
in conjunction with generic knowledge of mechanisms, theoretical background
knowledge and generic causal knowledge to establish single-case causal claims.
But these single-case causal relations are then generalised by induction to a
new generic causal claim. Academic autopsies thus contribute, unlike the other
kinds of autopsy, to generic medical knowledge.
To give a flavour of this kind of inference, consider a few examples of aca-
demic autopsy:
• Tsokos et al. (2000), Pressure sores: epidemiology, medico-legal implica-
tions and forensic argumentation concerning causality, examined 10222
corpses in order to identify the frequencies and grading of pressure sores
in various groups (age, gender, contributing cause of death, etc.) and to
establish a causal relationship between pressure sores and fatal infectious
complications or septicemia.
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• Terrabuio Junior et al. (2007), Autopsy-proven causes of death in lungs of
patients immunocompromised by secondary interstitial pneumonia, looked
at 558 autopsies of patients who died during a stay in hospital after sec-
ondary interstitial pneumonia. In each case the authors examined the
cause of the pneumonia (and thence death), and then generalised to de-
termine which potential causes of pneumonia actually made a significant
difference to the risk of death and could thus be counted as a generic-level
cause. The aim was to use the results of this study to identify and treat
those hospital patients who have a high risk of death from pneumonia.
‘It is thus important to know the main causes of death in this population
to establish correct prophylactic actions, which are the cheaper and more
intelligent ways to prevent secondary interstitial pneumonia’ (p.70).
• Abdel-Karim et al. (2007), Causes of death at autopsy in an inpatient
hospice program, looked at 48 autopsies to ascertain the direct cause of
death of individual hospice inpatients. While there were a variety of direct
causes of death at the single-case level, the authors identified pneumonia
as the significant direct cause of death at the generic level.
• Taggart and Craver (2006), Causes of death, determined by autopsy, in
previously healthy (or near-healthy) children presenting to a children’s hos-
pital, looked at 572 autopsies, determining the cause of death in each case,
in order to identify the generic-level causes. They identified bacterial in-
fection and neoplasia to be the key causes at the generic level.
Some remarks are in order. First, inferences in academic autopsy are neither
simply top-down nor simply bottom-up. In fact, single-case autopsy results
have to be established first, and then these are used as a basis for inferring a
generic causal claim. What is used, then, is not a top-down or bottom-up causal
epistemology but a subtle blend of the two.
Second, while one might think that one can trivially infer from A is a cause
of B in the single case to A is a cause of B in general, this kind of inference
is not appropriate to academic autopsy. At the generic level, population-wide
difference-making is important—a cause should make a significant generic dif-
ference to its effects. This is because the generic causal claims are used primarily
for prediction and control; but if a cause makes no overall difference to its effect
then one can neither use the cause to predict the effect nor can one control the
effect by controlling the cause. (Single-case causal claims, on the other hand,
are primarily used for explanation and it only matters that the cause made a
difference to the individual, not to the population as a whole.) Suppose, to take
a toy example, that an individual had a peculiar genetic make-up that ensured
that imbibing a glass of red wine each evening caused his death; a coroner’s
autopsy rightly revealed this to be the cause of death in this single case. One
might try to generalise and say that imbibing a glass of red wine each evening is
a cause of death at the generic level. But, at the generic level, having a glass of
red wine each evening is a preventative of death: for all other individuals in the
population, their genetic make-up ensures that red wine in moderation prevents
heart disease, and, on balance, lowers the generic probability of an early demise.
It is this latter causal inference that is analogous to that of academic autopsy.
So while, for causal inference in autopsy, difference-making is important at
both levels, a different kind of difference-making is required at each level. At
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the generic level the difference-making is population-wide. For instance, Tsokos
et al. (2000, p. 283) say that ‘[. . . ] a significant correlation was found between
the prevalence of pressure sores and certain underlying diseases, e.g. trauma,
senile dementia, neurological diseases, apoplexy and marasmus;’ Terrabuio Ju-
nior et al. (2007, p. 69) evaluate the risks of various factors and make such
claims as the following: ‘in patients with lung cancer or cachexia, the risk of
death by bronchopneumonia as determined histologically was high (OR = 3.6;
OR=2.6, respectively);’ Abdel-Karim et al. (2007, p. 894) identify pneumonia
as the significant generic cause of death of hospice patients because ‘Pneumonia
was present in 79% of the autopsied patients (n = 38) and appeared to be the
major cause of death in 44% of patients (n = 21). It contributed to death in
an additional 17% (n = 8) and was found incidentally in 19% of patients (n =
9). Twenty-one percent of patients (n = 10) had no evidence of pneumonia on
autopsy.’
Third, as in the case of other kinds of autopsy, causal inferences in academic
autopsy require evidence of mechanisms as well as evidence of difference-making.
A causal claim cannot be considered established at the generic level without a
plausible mechanism linking the cause and the effect. Consider for instance
(Fornaro et al., 2008, p. 408), who conducted a postmortem study on patients
dead of cardiac diseases. The goal of the study was to ‘assess the incidence of
cardiac rupture and compare it with the other causes of cardiac death.’ The
authors collected a fair amount of statistics pointing to heart rupture in a num-
ber of different cases. Their results, however, rest at a very conjectural level as
‘the responsible mechanism is not yet known.’
Error measurement. Clinical autopsy is sometimes used to monitor diag-
nostic or treatment error: in what proportion of cases is the diagnosis that is
made while the patient is alive the correct diagnosis? This is yet another form
of autopsy inference. Although it doesn’t squarely fall under any of the strate-
gies discussed in §2, it is an important form of inference, as results of clinical
autopsies may inform, e.g., medical practice or public health. See for instance
Shojania et al. (2003), Cummings et al. (2007), Jo¨nssona et al. (2007), Ullah
and Alamgir (2006).
5 Causal Epistemology Revisited
It is time to reconsider the three epistemological answers to the question of the
relation of the levels, as outlined in §2. The three views are: causal inference is
top-down; causal inference is bottom-up; causal inference is independent at each
level. (These are not the only possible answers to the epistemological question,
but they are the answers that are prevalent in the literature.)
As the discussion of the two types of inference in autopsy in §4 shows, these
three standard views all fail. In the case of autopsy, causal inference is certainly
not independent at each level: each kind of autopsy infers causal claims at one
level from those at the other. But neither is exclusively top-down or exclusively
bottom up: some inferences are top-down (in coroner’s, forensic and clinical au-
topsy); others are a mixture of top-down and bottom-up (in academic autopsy).
Thus none of the answers of §2 fits the case of autopsy.
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Hence the epistemological relation between the levels is more subtle than that
captured by any of the three standard views. Any viable causal epistemology
must be able to handle the complex interplay between top-down and bottom-up
causal inference that takes place in autopsy, for example.
6 Causal Metaphysics Revisited
Let us now turn to the three responses of §3 to the question of the metaphysical
connection between the levels. These responses were: generic causal relations
are primitive; single-case causal relations are primitive; the levels of causation
are metaphysically independent.
The argument. In this section we will argue that these three views do not
hold water. But our argument will be less direct than that of the last section.
It is not that autopsy provides a straightforward counterexample to each of
these three views—as it does to each of the epistemological views of §2—but,
rather, that autopsy creates a problem for each of the metaphysical theories of
causality that support these three views. We saw in §3 that, broadly speak-
ing, the standard metaphysical theories of causality can be classed as either
difference-making or mechanistic. Mechanistic theories of causality tend to sup-
port the view that single-case causal relations are primitive, while difference-
making theories support the view that generic-causal relations are primitive if
the difference-making in question is generic, or that single-case relations are
primitive if the difference-making invoked by the theory is single-case. Plu-
ralistic theories of causality can be used to support the view that each level
admits of its own analysis (Eells adopts a different difference-making theory
at each level; Weber advocates a mechanistic theory for the single case and a
difference-making theory at the generic level).
The key point to note is that most metaphysical theories of causality—
including pluralistic combinations of these theories (Williamson, 2006a)—analyse
any particular causal relation either in terms of difference-making relations or
in terms of mechanistic relations, but not both.5 Now in the health sciences in
general (Russo and Williamson, 2007) and in the case of autopsy in particular
(§4), evidence both of mechanisms and of difference-making is normally required
to establish a causal claim. To determine that Alf’s heart attack was a cause
of his death, the medical practitioner needs to have evidence both that there is
viable biological mechanism linking heart-attack and death and that the heart
5There are exceptions such as Glennan (2002), discussed below. Note however that several
accounts that apparently appeal to both aspects simultaneously do not on closer inspection.
While apparently appealing to both mechanisms and counterfactuals, Glennan (2009) is in
fact pluralist, while for Craver counterfactuals are used as tests. Glennan (2009) distinguishes
two concepts: (i) causal relevance and (ii) causal production. On the one hand, a property,
in his account, is causally relevant to an event if the event counterfactually depends on the
property; on the other hand, an event causally produces another if they are connected by a
chain of causal processes. (In fact for Glennan, mechanisms are truthmakers for both kinds of
causal claim.) In Craver’s account, counterfactuals do not enter the definition of ‘mechanism’
but are rather used to evaluate causal claims. Indeed, Craver (2007, ch. 4) does not mention
any counterfactual element in the features of mechanisms; on the contrary, he stresses—e.g.,
Craver (2007, p. 64, 65, 86)—that counterfactuals and manipulations serve to evaluate causal
mechanisms; that is to say, counterfactuals are tests, not definers.
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attack made a difference to his death (brought it about sooner than might oth-
erwise be expected). At the generic level, in order to establish that pneumonia
is a cause of death in hospital patients, those conducting an academic autopsy
need to be aware of evidence both of a mechanism linking pneumonia and death,
and that pneumonia makes a significant difference to death in the population
in question.
But it is very hard for standard metaphysical theories of causality to account
for this epistemic practice. If a particular causal claim is to be given a mecha-
nistic analysis then surely mechanistic evidence would suffice to establish that
claim. The proponent of the mechanistic analysis cannot explain why, in cases
where there is excellent mechanistic evidence, evidence of difference-making is
also required.6 On the other hand, if the causal claim in question is to be given
a difference-making analysis then surely difference-making evidence would suf-
fice to establish it. The proponent of the difference-making analysis cannot
explain why, in cases where excellent difference-making evidence is not wanting,
evidence of a viable biological mechanism is also required.
In sum, each of the standard metaphysical theories of causality fails to ac-
count for the epistemic practice of autopsy inference. Hence these metaphysical
theories cannot be considered viable as they stand. But the three standard
answers to the metaphysical connection between the levels were motivated by
these metaphysical theories. This leaves the three views of §3 unmotivated.
There are no grounds for preferring one of the views over any of the others, nor
indeed for thinking that any one of them is correct.
Scope of the argument. We should emphasise that the requirement for ev-
idence both of mechanisms and of difference-making is not confined to autopsy.
That difference-making evidence is required is rarely controversial; but mecha-
nisms are widely called for too. For instance, according to Hill (1965, p. 10), a
classic in the health science literature, a causal claim should either (i) be bio-
logically plausible or (ii) be the only possible explanation of the phenomenon in
question.7 A similar point is made, more recently, by Swaen and van Amelsvoo
(2008). In the social sciences, Gerring (2005, p. 179) claims that ‘Even in the
most perfect experimental context where a causal relationship between two en-
tities seems validated, one is unlikely to feel that an argument is clinched until a
causal mechanism has been identified.’ And analogously, in their survey paper
on causation in demography Nı´ Bhrolcha´in and Dyson (2007, p. 25) claim that
‘Specifying and providing evidence of the mechanism involved is essential.’ In
philosophy, Psillos (2004) put forward the idea that we can get a glimpse of
the ‘secret connexion’ between cause and effect by using both mechanisms and
counterfactuals (i.e., difference-making).
Gillies (2010, §2) poses some questions for the thesis, put forward in Russo
and Williamson (2007), that typically evidence both of mechanisms and of
difference-making is required to establish a causal claim. First, what kind of
6The proponent of the mechanistic analysis might argue that difference-making evidence
can help establish the existence of a mechanism. But it still remains the case that according to
this sort of position, once the mechanism is established no further difference-making evidence
is required. It is this last point that we contest (Russo and Williamson, 2007).
7It is worth noting that Hill never considered his points as ‘criteria’ but just as guidelines.
However, this is not relevant to our argument, which is just to point out what ‘elements’ are
required to establish causal claims.
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difference-making evidence is required? As Gillies suggests, statistical evidence
is appropriate in the health sciences. We would agree with this, and point out
that in the health sciences, and in particular in autopsy inference, it is usual to
provide evidence that the cause and effect are probabilistically dependent con-
ditional on possible confounding factors (i.e., conditional on the effect’s other
causes). We leave it open as to whether causal claims in other domains re-
quire other kinds of difference-making evidence: e.g., in the law, evidence of a
counterfactual dependence between cause and effect may be required; in policy
science, evidence of a dependence under intervention may be required.
Second, how plausible does the mechanism need to be in order for a causal
claim to be established? Gillies distinguishes between a plausible mechanism
and a confirmed mechanism, and suggests that it may suffice to show that there
is a plausible mechanism linking the cause to the effect. We would suggest that
the answer to this question depends on the epistemic context. Consider again
the use of autopsy to determine the cause of death. If the results of the autopsy
are to be presented in a civil legal case, then it may be sufficient that the cause
of death be established on the balance of probabilities. On the other hand if the
autopsy results are to be presented in a criminal case, then the cause of death
may need to be established beyond reasonable doubt. In the latter situation
the causal claim needs to be more credible, and correspondingly the evidence
for the causal claim needs to be more credible. In a civil case, it can be enough
that it is plausible that there is an underlying mechanism, but in a criminal case
the mechanism itself may need to be established. (The epistemic context can
also vary with type of autopsy: clinical and academic autopsies can be more
speculative than coroners’ and forensic autopsies in that while the latter are
meant to conclusively determine the principal cause of death, the former are
intended to pick up on a wider range of contributing causes. Hence evidence
of underlying mechanisms may be more speculative in the case of clinical and
academic autopsy.)
The way forward. Where does our argument leave our understanding of
causality? Although the standard metaphysical theories of causality do not
hold water for the reasons outlined above, we do not conclude that all attempts
to analyse causality are doomed. There is at least one viable option as we shall
now see.
One might suggest that one should appeal to both mechanisms and difference-
making to analyse causality—arguably this is the approach of Glennan (2002),
for instance. But one should beware of a simple-minded conjunctive analysis of
the form: A is a cause of B if and only if (i) there is an appropriate mechanism
linking A and B, and (ii) A stands in the right difference-making relation to
B. This conjunctive analysis is unappealing for reasons that are independent of
the problems outlined above. We alluded above to an epistemological problem
facing standard metaphysical theories of causality: their inability to cope with
multifarious evidence. But there are other problems too. Most notably, they
are prone to counterexamples. There are well known cases in which causality
is accompanied by mechanisms but no difference-making (Williamson, 2009),
and there are also cases, often involving absences as causal relata, in which
causal relations are accompanied by difference-making but no physical mecha-
nisms. (These counterexamples led Hall (2004) to advocate pluralism, but, as
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mentioned above, pluralism also succumbs to the epistemological problem—see
Williamson (2006a) on this point.) While these counterexamples give the stan-
dard analyses of causality a rough time, they will give a conjunctive analysis an
even rougher time: such an analysis will be prone to all the counterexamples,
not just one sort or another. For this reason, a conjunctive analysis is, we think,
not viable.
There is another option, though, that has better prospects: an epistemic
theory of causality. Here is not the place to offer a detailed description or
a sustained defence of the epistemic theory—see Williamson (2005, 2006a,b,
2007, 2009) and Russo and Williamson (2007) for more detailed discussion of
the epistemic theory and its application to the health science domain. We shall
merely give a flavour of the theory; enough to suggest that it has the potential to
avoid the problems discussed in this paper and is worthy of further investigation.
According to the epistemic approach, a metaphysics for causality can be
derived from an epistemology of causality. This is not a bad thing, since the
metaphysics of causality is notoriously controversial, while there is substantial
agreement (at least amongst practicing scientists) as to the kinds of way in
which we can come to know about causal relations. The epistemic theory pro-
ceeds as follows. A causal epistemology can be thought of as a mapping from
sets of possible evidence to sets of causal relationships: given one’s evidence,
a causal epistemology yields one or more sets of causal relationships that are
compatible with that evidence. Now imagine that one had total evidence—
one knew everything there was to know about the fundamental furniture of the
world: the fundamental objects and the pattern of instantiation of the funda-
mental properties and the fundamental relations. Presumably, then, the correct
causal epistemology—call it mapping —would yield the correct set of causal
relationships. (This ought to be the case whatever one’s metaphysical views
about causality.) The epistemic theory takes this to be all there is to causality:
according to this view, the causal relation is not one of the fundamental relations
to be taken as basic in an ontology, nor does it supervene on the fundamental
stuff by being definable in terms of difference-making or mechanisms; rather,
the correct set of causal relationships is just the set of relationships that would
result from applying mapping  to total evidence. The epistemic theory, then,
analyses the causal relation in terms of causal epistemology.
The usual practice, of course, is to go from metaphysics to epistemology: to
construe the correct causal epistemology as the mapping that, when applied to
total evidence, would yield the causal relation. In order to turn this around one
needs an independent handle on the causal epistemology. What makes  the
correct causal epistemology, rather than an arbitrary mapping? According to
the epistemic theory, the uses of our causal claims determine the causal episte-
mology. Causal claims are put to a variety of uses, inferential (e.g., prediction
and control) as well as explanatory, and the correct causal epistemology is the
mapping that yields claims which best fulfill these uses—i.e., which lead to the
best inferences and explanations. In sum, then, the epistemic theory analyses
the causal relation in terms of the mapping  which is in turn characterised in
terms of the inferential and explanatory role of the claims that we call ‘causal’.
Causality is the relation that best fulfills the role demanded of it, nothing more.
It is worth emphasising that the epistemic theory is a metaphysical, rather
than epistemological, theory—it is an account of what causality is. According
to this theory, causal claims, be they generic or single-case, may be construed as
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claims about rational belief (Williamson, 2005): C is a cause of E iff an agent
with total evidence, the ideal causal epistemology, and the capacity to apply
the latter to the former, ought to hold a particular sort of directed belief from
C to E; such beliefs licence certain inferences that we call ‘causal’ inferences—
these include inferences about interventions, as well as some predictive and
explanatory inferences—and it is the appropriateness of these inferences that
determine the ideal causal epistemology and hence that determine the set of
beliefs deemed rational.8
Although the epistemic account is a metaphysical theory, the metaphysical
and the epistemological aspects of causality are very tightly meshed. This has
its own advantages: if causal relationships are what the epistemic theory says
they are, there is no mystery as to how one can come to know about them.
How does the epistemic theory overcome the difficulties that we have en-
countered in this paper? First, it takes causal epistemology as basic and does
not force this epistemology into any of the straightjacket views of §2. There
is no claim that we only learn causal relations top-down; nor bottom-up; nor
independently at each level. Thus the epistemic theory withstands the sub-
tlety of causal inference in autopsy, for instance, which admits both top-down
and bottom-up causal discovery. Second, the epistemic theory neither analyses
causality solely in terms of mechanisms nor solely in terms of difference-making,
and so it neither asserts the supremacy of evidence of mechanisms nor of evi-
dence of difference-making. It thus avoids the epistemological trap into which
the views of §3 fall, and copes with another key aspect of inference in autopsy.
In reality the correct causal epistemology will yield causal relationships on the
basis of a variety of kinds of evidence—including that of mechanisms and that
of difference-making—and there is no reason to suspect that an easy analysis of
causality in terms of one or other or both of these indicators is possible. Third,
the epistemic theory avoids the counterexamples to mechanistic and difference-
making accounts (and hence conjunctive accounts). Indeed, by analysing causal-
ity in terms of the correct causal epistemology, no counterexample is possible.
A counterexample takes the following form: analysis X of causality deems A to
be a cause of B (or, not a cause), but clearly A is not a cause of B (respectively,
is a cause); hence analysis X is false. But, if A is clearly not a cause of B
then presumably the ideal causal epistemology would not yield the claim ‘A is a
cause of B’ when applied to total evidence, in which case the epistemic theory
could not deem A to be a cause of B—no counterexample is possible.
Hence the epistemic theory withstands this rather substantial array of prob-
lems that beset other theories of causality.
8Of course, as to how to characterise the ideal causal epistemology is open to some spec-
ulation. In Williamson (2005) a hybrid of hypothetico-deductive and inductive epistemology
is proposed and in Russo (2009) it is argued that the epistemic theory is compatible with
a variational epistemology. A variational epistemology says, simply put, that reasoning un-
derlying the discovery and confirmation of causal relations hinges on the notion of variation.
A variational epistemology is not confined to either level—generic or single-case. Quite to
the contrary, it can be shown that the concept of variation plays a role in causal discovery
and confirmation at the generic level as well as in the single-case (Russo, 2009, ch. 7). This
means that a ‘level-monism’ does not enter from the back door—the epistemic theory does
not require an epistemology that is ‘single-level’, so to speak.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the question of how the levels of causation are
related, splitting the question into two: (i) whether causal relationships at one
level can be evidence for causal relationships at the other level (epistemology),
and (ii) whether causal relationships at one level can be reduced to causal rela-
tionships at the other level (metaphysics). Concerning the first, epistemological
question, in §2 we discussed three kinds of answer, categorised according to
whether inference is top-down, bottom-up, or the levels are independent. As
for the second, metaphysical question, in §3 we discussed three kinds of answer,
categorised according to whether single-case relations are reduced to generic,
generic relations are reduced to single-case, or the levels are independent.
We then argued that autopsy (§4) is an interesting test case because none
of the standard epistemologies (§5) nor metaphysics (§6) squarely fits it. After
introducing the different types of autopsy, we showed that inferences are neither
universally top-down nor universally bottom-up, but instead a blend of the two.
In autopsy, moreover, causal relations are neither reducible to difference-making
relationships nor to mechanisms, but rather both kinds of evidence are required
in order to establish a causal claim.
Those considerations led us to suggest a different view of causality—the
epistemic theory—that has the potential to overcome the difficulties raised by
standard epistemologies and metaphysics. Our claim is that we need an account
of causality that treats single-case and generic causal claims in an egalitarian
way and that allows one to go back and forth from one to the other—none
of the standard epistemologies are adequate in this respect. Also, we need
an account of causality that treats mechanisms and difference-making in an
egalitarian way—none of the standard metaphysics are adequate in this respect.9
This does not mean that we are pluralists. We do not endorse the view that
causation can be neatly divided into a set of cases where a mechanistic relation
is the salient relation and another set of cases where difference-making is the
salient relation (Hall, 2004). Rather, we need a single metaphysical account
that puts different kinds of evidence, mechanistic and difference-making, on an
equal footing. Put otherwise, evidential pluralism (which we endorse) ought not
to be confused with metaphysical pluralism (which we reject).
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